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Johnson v. Johnson: Personal Injury Awards in Divorce Actions
The typical personal injury case involves two parties: the injured plaintiff
and the defendant who allegedly caused the injury. In these cases the parties
argue to determine what, if any, liability should be imposed on the defendant.
In a divorce proceeding, however, the nature of a personal injury dispute
changes entirely. The husband and wife are attempting to divide the assets of
the marital estate. A personal injury award received by one of the spouses may
well be one of the more substantial assets held by the parties. It is natural,
therefore, that when a personal injury award is involved, there is often a dispute
over who gets to keep the award. The injured spouse claims that the award is
not a marital asset at all and belongs solely to him or her; the uninjured spouse
contends that the personal injury award is marital property and thus subject to
distribution. I
The North Carolina Supreme Court recently decided a case of first impres-
sion involving a personal injury dispute in the divorce context. In Johnson v.
Johnson2 the supreme court took the middle ground, holding that the award
consists of both marital and separate property. The part of the award that com-
pensates for pain and suffering and disfigurement belongs solely to the injured
spouse; the part that replaces lost earnings and expenses incurred by the marital
estate belongs to the marital estate; and any portion of the damages that com-
pensates the uninjured spouse for loss of consortium belongs to that spouse
alone.3
This Note examines the Johnson decision in light of North Carolina equita-
ble distribution law. It discusses the policy underlying equitable distribution law
and the evolution of property distribution in this state. The Note also explores
the various ways that personal injury awards in divorce proceedings have been
treated by courts in other jurisdictions. It then analyzes the Johnson decision in
light of this background and concludes that the decision is a sound one that
reconciles conflicting interests and goals present in North Carolina's equitable
distribution law.
Robert Lee Johnson, plaintiff, and Doris Wilkie Johnson, defendant, were
married in 1957. Plaintiff was involved in a motorcycle accident in February
1981 that left him seriously injured.4 In August of the same year, the couple
separated. After the parties had separated, but before they were actually di-
vorced, plaintiff settled his personal injury claim for ninety-five thousand dol-
lars.5 Defendant filed a motion for equitable distribution; pursuant to this
1. In North Carolina the marital property of a couple is subject to distribution, but the sepa-
rate property of each spouse is not. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984). North Carolina's system
of equitable distribution is discussed infra notes 31-45 and accompanying text.
2. 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430 (1986).
3. Id. at 446-51, 346 S.E.2d at 435-38.
4. Plaintiff suffered a 50% permanent disability in his right foot. Id. at 440, 346 S.E.2d at 432.
5. Defendant-Appellant's New Brief at 8, Johnson (No. 471PA85). Plaintiff filed for divorce
in August 1982 based on the one-year separation period. He received his settlement at about this
motion, each party filed an affidavit describing the marital property subject to
distribution. In most respects, the parties' affidavits were not in conflict. How-
ever, they differed in their characterization of the largest asset, the personal in-
jury settlement. Plaintiff listed the award as his separate property, and
defendant claimed that it was marital property subject to distribution. 6 The trial
judge awarded the asset to plaintiff as separate property. 7 Defendant appealed
based solely on the judge's characterization of the personal injury award.
The court of appeals unanimously affirmed the equitable distribution or-
der.8 However, the appellate court was divided over the correct rationale.
Judge Phillips claimed that personal injury awards are clearly separate property
in North Carolina. He argued that North Carolina General Statutes section 52-
4,9 which states that damages for the personal injuries of a married person be-
long to that person alone, mandated this conclusion. 10 Judges Arnold and
Cozort disagreed with this rationale. Their concurring opinion stated that per-
sonal injury awards are marital property in North Carolina. They explained
that marital property is defined in the Equitable Distribution Act as all property
not expressly defined as separate property under the Act." Because personal
injury awards are not listed as separate property, they reasoned, the awards are
necessarily marital property. 12 Judges Arnold and Cozort agreed that there was
an apparent conflict between their conclusion and the statement in North Caro-
lina General Statutes section 52-4, but stated that "[w]hen two acts of the legis-
lature ... are necessarily repugnant, the last one enacted shall prevail.' 1 3 The
Equitable Distribution Act was enacted long after section 52-4. Therefore, the
judges concluded that the personal injury award was marital rather than sepa-
rate property. The concurrence stated that this analysis was irrelevant in the
case at hand, however. In North Carolina the marital estate is measured on the
time. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 440, 346 S.E.2d at 432. The judgment of divorce did not become final
until December 16, 1982. See Record at 24, Johnson.
6. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 440, 346 S.E.2d at 432.
7. See Record at 31, Johnson. The equitable distribution order stated that personal injury
awards were separate property according to North Carolina law. Id. The judge cited N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20 (1984) for authority. Id.
Because the personal injury award was deemed plaintiff's separate property, plaintiff had a
larger amount of separate assets than defendant. The judge therefore awarded defendant the major-
ity of the marital estate. See id. at 35-36.
8. Johnson v. Johnson, 75 N.C. App. 659, 331 S.E.2d 211, rev'd, 317 N.C. 437, 346 S.E.2d 430
(1986).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1984).
10. Johnson, 75 N.C. App. at 660, 331 S.E.2d at 212. Judge Phillips further stated that per-
sonal injury proceeds should be characterized as separate property based on the Equitable Distribu-
tion Act as well as on section 52-4. The Equitable Distribution Act, he explained, does not purport
to "require either party to contribute his or her bodily health and powers to the assets for distribu-
tion." Id. at 661, 331 S.E.2d at 212. Because the personal injury involves harm to the physical
condition of a spouse, then, the award belongs to that spouse alone. See id.
11. Id. at 661-62, 331 S.E.2d at 212 (Arnold and Cozort, JJ., concurring).
12. Id. (Arnold and Cozort, JJ., concurring). This method of analyzing the nature of personal
injury awards has been called the mechanistic analysis. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 445-46, 346 S.E.2d
at 435.
13. Johnson, 75 N.C. App. at 662, 331 S.E.2d at 212 (Arnold and Cozort, JJ., concurring)
(citing State Highway Comm'n v. Hemphill, 269 N.C. 535, 153 S.E.2d 22 (1967); Nytco Leasing Inc.
v. Southeastern Motels, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 120, 252 S.E.2d 826 (1979)).
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date on which the parties separated; 14 because plaintiff did not settle his claim
until after this valuation date, the award was his separate property in this
instance.15
Defendant then appealed to the North Carolina Supreme Court, which
unanimously reversed the court of appeals.1 6 The supreme court first disposed
of the lower court's contention that there was a conflict among the statutes.
According to the supreme court, section 52-4 governs a situation that is entirely
different from that involved in section 50-20, the equitable distribution statute.
Section 52-4 was enacted to give married women the right to sue on their own
behalf;17 consequently, the statute confers this right on married persons and
does not apply to single or divorced individuals.18 The purpose of section 50-20,
on the other hand, is to give North Carolina courts guidelines so they can fairly
distribute the assets of divorcing spouses. The system in effect in North Caro-
lina does not purport to regulate or classify property during the course of the
marriage itself. In addition, "the fact that legal title to property acquired during
the marriage is in one or the other spouse, or in both, is not controlling in the...
classification of property" for the purpose of equitable distribution. 19 Therefore,
the Johnson court concluded that the two statutes are not contradictory.20
The court proceeded to decide whether personal injury awards constitute
marital property subject to distribution or separate property exempt from distri-
bution. First, the court described the various approaches taken in other jurisdic-
tions.2 1 The court joined a minority of the equitable distribution states by
14. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (1984) C" 'Marital property' means all real and personal
property acquired by either spouse... during the course of the marriage and before the date ofthe
separation of the parties." (emphasis added)).
15. Johnson, 75 N.C. App. at 661, 331 S.E.2d at 212 (Arnold and Cozort, JJ., concurring). The
concurring opinion thus adopted the view that the personal injury award was acquired at the time of
the settlement rather than at the time of the injury itself. Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled
both ways on this issue. See infra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
16. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 440, 346 S.E.2d at 432.
17. The statute provides:
The earnings of a married person by virtue of any contract for his or her personal service,
and any damages for personal injuries, or other tort sustained by either, can be recovered
by such person suing alone, and such earnings or recovery shall be his or her sole and
separate property.
N.C. GEN STAT. § 52-4 (1984).
18. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 440-43, 346 S.E.2d at 432-33.
19. Id. at 444, 346 S.E.2d at 434.
20. Id. at 443-45, 346 S.E.2d at 433-34.
21. The majority of the equitable distribution jurisdictions follow the mechanistic approach and
label a personal injury award as entirely marital property. Id. at 445-46, 346 S.E.2d at 435. This
method of classification was embraced in the concurring opinion in the court of appeals. See supra
note 12 and accompanying text. In the one other North Carolina case to examine the issue, the
court of appeals apparently adopted this approach. See Little v. Little, 74 N.C. App. 12, 16, 327
S.E.2d 283, 287-88 (1985). Little is discussed infra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
Most community property states have adopted the analytic approach. These states view the
personal injury award as comprised of several components. Part of the award is the separate prop-
erty of the injured spouse; another portion is community property; and yet a third segment may be
declared the property of the uninjured spouse. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 446-47, 346 S.E.2d at 435-
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adopting what is known as the analytic approach.22 The court explained that
personal injury awards are composed of "three potential elements of damages":
(1) compensation for pain, suffering, and actual physical harm, which is the
property of the injured spouse; (2) compensation for lost income and for medical
expenses, which is part of the marital estate; and (3) compensation for loss of
consortium, which belongs to the uninjured spouse.23 The court further stated
that the party claiming that the award or any part of it is separate property bears
the burden of proof. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the trial court
so that the award could be examined and appropriately classified.24 Although
the court allocated the burden of proof in this manner, it stated that it was not
doing so because of a presumption that all property is marital. The court ex-
plained that, although several court of appeals cases have held otherwise, the
equitable distribution statute does not create a presumption of marital
property. 25
Justice Martin added a brief concurrence. He first stated that the North
Carolina equitable distribution statute creates a presumption that a personal in-
jury award is marital property. 26 This presumption exists, he explained, in cases
in which the injury itself occurred before the date of separation. 27 According to
Justice Martin, the court had looked to the injury rather than the settlement to
determine the date on which the property was acquired because it had deter-
mined that the cause of action was the property at issue.28 He believed that the
court should have expressly announced its conclusion. 29 In addition, Justice
Martin felt that compensation for disfigurement, which the majority classified as
separate property, should be divided into components. The portion of the award
constituting pain and suffering due to disfigurement should be deemed separate
property; however, any part of the damages that represents lost earnings due to
disfigurement should be considered marital property.
30
Prior to 1981 the issue involved in the Johnson case would have been re-
solved much more easily. At that time North Carolina courts took the tradi-
tional common-law approach to property division, dividing property according
to which spouse was responsible for its acquisition.3 1 Under such a system, a
36. The mechanistic and analytic approaches are discussed infra notes 67-96 and accompanying
text.
Finally, the court noted that a few states provide that personal injury proceeds are separate
property. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 446, 346 S.E.2d at 435-36.
22. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 450-51, 346 S.E.2d at 438.
23. Id. at 447, 346 S.E.2d at 436.
24. Id. at 454-55, 346 $.E.2d at 439-40.
25. See id. at 454-55 n.4, 346 S.E.2d at 440 n.4.
26. Id. at 455, 346 S.E.2d at 440 (Martin, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 455, 346 S.E.2d at 440-41 (Martin, J., concurring).
28. Id. at 456, 346 S.E.2d at 441 (Martin, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 455-56, 346 S.E.2d at 440-41 (Martin, J., concurring). Justice Martin claimed that
this conclusion is a "premise which the majority relies on but does not discuss." Id. at 455, 346
S.E.2d at 440 (Martin, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 456-57, 346 S.E.2d at 441 (Martin, J., concurring).
31. See Comment, The North Carolina Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, 18
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 735, 735 (1982); Survey of Developments in North Carolina Law, 1981-The
Equitable Distribution Act, 60 N.C.L. REv. 1396, 1396 (1982).
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personal injury award would belong solely to the person who received the settle-
ment. In 1981, however, the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a sys-
tem that provides for the division of property based on equitable considerations
other than title.32 The statute was enacted because of the realization that the
title system often led to unfair results, awarding the working spouse property in
recognition of his or her economic contributions to the marriage but ignoring
the nonmonetary contributions of the homemaker. 33 The inequities of the title
system became apparent in the North Carolina Supreme Court case of
Leatherman v. Leatherman.34 The Leatherman court denied Ms. Leatherman
any rights in her husband's closely held corporation even though she had
worked for the corporation full time without salary and had contributed to its
growth and development. The court ruled this way because Ms. Leatherman
did not possess an enforceable interest in the business.35 According to some
commentators, it was the Leatherman decision that awakened the state to the
problems inherent in the title system and prompted the general assembly to
adopt a property distribution system that recognized factors other than title.36
North Carolina General Statutes section 50-20 lays out the current frame-
work for classification and distribution of marital property. First, the court
must classify the assets of the parties as either marital or separate property. 37
The court then must proceed to divide the marital assets between the spouses.38
32. Act of July 3, 1981, ch. 815, 1981 N.C. Sess. Laws 1184 (codified as amended at N.C. GEN.
STAT. §§ 50-20 to -21 (1984)).
33. See White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 774-75, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1985); Comment, supra
note 30, at 735. The title system has been widely criticized on these grounds. See, e.g., Rothman v.
Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974); L. GOLDEN, EQUITABLE DISTRmBtrION
OF PROPERTY § 1,03, at 4-5 (1983); G. MCLELLAN, EQUITABLE DISTRIBuTIoN LAW AND PRAC-
TICE § 1.5 (1985).
34. 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979).
35. Id. at 619-22, 256 S.E.2d at 795-96. The wife ultimately received "the maximum she could
get under North Carolina law-her half of the marital home in the entireties." Sharp, The Partner-
ship Ideal: The Development of Equitable Distribution in North Carolina, 65 N.C.L. REv. 195, 196
n.4 (1987).
36. See, e.g., White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 774, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831 (1985); Wade v. Wade, 72
N.C. App. 372, 379, 325 S.E.2d 260, 267-68, disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
37. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b) (1984). The statute defines "marital property" as
all real and personal property acquired by either spouse or both spouses during the course
of the marriage and before the date of separation of the parties, and presently owned,
except property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision (2) of
this section. Marital property includes all vested pension and retirement rights, including
military pensions eligible.
Id. Separate property, then, consists of those assets specifically exempted from the pool of distribut-
able property. The scope of separate property under the statute is discussed infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
38. North Carolina opted for a system in which the court can only distribute the portion of the
property that it has labeled marital property. See Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North
Carolina: A Preliminary Analysis, 61 N.C.L. REv 247, 248-49 (1983). An alternative system, cur-
rently in effect in several states, gives courts the discretion to divide all of the property owned by the
spouses. These states are commonly referred to as all-property states. See L. GOLDEN, supra note
33, § 2.02; G. McLELLAN, supra note 33, §§ 6.8-6.9; Sharp, supra, at 248-49. The Uniform Mar-
riage and Divorce Act presents both alternatives, but recommends the all-property method. See
UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1979).
The alternative adopted by North Carolina resembles the community property system in some
respects. Community property states also make the distinction between marital property--or com-
munity property, as it is called in those states-and separate property, and divide the former between
1336 [Vol. 65
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The court must divide the assets equally unless, in its discretion, it determines
that fairness calls for an unequal distribution.39 The statutorily mandated pre-
sumption of equal division is a strong one that can be overcome only if the court
specifies " 'some reason[s] compelling a contrary result.' "40 This presumption
reflects the concept that marriage is a partnership to which each partner contrib-
utes equally.4 1
The partnership ideal has played an important role in shaping North Caro-
lina's equitable distribution law. In interpreting this statute, North Carolina
courts have kept this principle in mind.42 Prior to the decision in Johnson, state
courts held that all property was presumed marital property.4 3 The spouse con-
tending that a particular asset was separate property bore the burden of proof;
he or she had to establish that the asset was separate with "clear, cogent and
convincing evidence." 44 The chance of overcoming this presumption was admit-
the spouses at divorce. See L. GOLDEN, supra note 33, § 1.04; G. McLELLAN, supra note 33, §§ 6.3-
6.6. In community property systems, however, half of the title vests in each spouse immediately at
the time of acquisition. Therefore, each party owns half of the marital estate at divorce and is
entitled as a matter of law to 50% of the assets. Under the North Carolina system, on the other
hand, the property is not divided into marital and separate assets until divorce; prior to that point,
the common-law title system prevails. Because of this distinction, North Carolina has been referred
to as a deferred community property state. See Greene, Comparison of the Property .4spects of the
Community Property and Common-Law Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatibility
with the Current View of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L.
REv. 71, 87 (1979); Sharp, supra, at 249; Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Com-
mon Law Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. Rv. 1269, 1283 (1981). Another distinction be-
tween the two systems is that in the deferred community property system the court can make an
unequal division based on equitable considerations. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984).
39. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984).
40. Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 215, 324 S.E.2d. 33, 41 (quoting Alexander v. Alexander,
68 N.C. App. 548, 552, 315 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1984)), cert denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393
(1985)). The statute allows the court to consider several factors in determining whether to make an
unequal division. See N.C. GEN STAT. § 50-20(c) (1984); see also Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 88,
331 S.E.2d 682, 687 (1985) (requiring courts to consider all factors in making this determination).
In addition to such factors as the assets, liabilities, health, financial obligations, and earning capacity
of the parties, the statute contains a provision allowing courts to consider "any other factor which
the court finds to be just and proper." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(12) (1984).
41. See Sharp, supra note 35, at 198-99.
42. See, eg., Smith v. Smith, 314 N.C. 80, 85-86, 331 S.E.2d 682, 686 (1985); White v. White,
312 N.C. 770, 775, 324 S.E.2d 829, 832 (1985); Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 209, 324 S.E.2d 33,
37, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393 (1985); see also Sharp, supra note 35, at 198-201
(discussing the importance of the partnership ideal in North Carolina).
43. See McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 157, 327 S.E.2d 910, 918, cert. denied, 314 N.C.
331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985); Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 209, 324 S.E.2d 33, 38, cerL denied,
313 N.C. 508, 329 S.E.2d 393 (1985).
44. Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 210, 324 S.E.2d 33, 38, cert denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329
S.E.2d 393 (1985). In Loeb the court of appeals found that the wife had failed to substantiate ade-
quately her claim that various pieces of property given to the couple by her mother were her separate
property. Id. at 211, 324 S.E.2d at 39.
The standard of proof adopted by the court in Loeb first surfaced in another context in Mims v.
Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982). Mims involved the purchase of real estate with the
husband's separate funds. Title to the property was in both parties' names. The trial court granted
summary judgment in favor of the wife in the face of the husband's contention that the property
belonged to him alone. Id. at 43-45, 286 S.E.2d at 783. The court of appeals reversed, and the
supreme court upheld the reversal. Id. at 45-46, 286 S.E.2d at 783. Nevertheless, the supreme court
found that a summary judgment was inappropriate because the presumption could be rebutted by
"'clear, cogent, and convincing proof.'" Id. at 57-58, 286 S.E.2d at 790 (quoting Bass v. Bass, 229
N.C. 171, 172, 48 S.E.2d 48, 49 (1948)).
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tedly small.4 5
Balanced against the partnership ideal is the desire to preserve the rights
and identities of the individuals involved in a marriage.46 This goal predates the
advent of equitable distribution law by many years. Long before the Equitable
Distribution Act was passed, the North Carolina General Assembly had enacted
a series of statutes that recognized the ability of each marital partner to manage
his or her own affairs without the joinder of the other spouse.47 One such stat-
ute, section 52-4,48 confers on married persons the right to sue and to earn in-
come, and further provides that any damages recovered or income earned
constitutes the separate property of the spouse.49 This statute changed the com-
mon-law rule that denied a wife the right to sue in her own name for injury to
her person.5 0
For a while it was unclear what effect the ability of each spouse to sue
independently to recover damages for personal injuries would have on the right
of the other spouse to sue for loss of consortium-the loss of whatever rights one
spouse has to a partner free from injury. Hinnant v. Tidewater Power Co.51 es-
tablished that, largely because the cause of action for loss of consortium consists'
of compensation for the economic losses covered in the injured spouse's suit, the
uninjured spouse had no cause of action for loss of consortium.5 2 Hinnant was
later overruled by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hospital.53 The Nich-
olson court ruled that consortium includes society, companionship, sexual grati-
45. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. at 211, 324 S.E.2d at 39.
46. See White v. White, 312 N.C. 770, 773-75, 324 S.E.2d 829, 831-32 (1985) (discussing the
movement in North Carolina to grant women greater rights as individuals). For a discussion of the
potential effect these individualistic concepts have on the marital sharing principles that have
emerged in recent years, and an argument that sharing principles should prevail, see Prager, Sharing
Principles and the Future of Marital Property Law, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1 (1977).
47. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 39-7 to -13.1, 52-1 to -12 (1984). The statutes were originally
enacted to guarantee these rights to women. Men, already having these powers, had no need of the
protection of the statutes. See White, 312 N.C. at 773-74, 324 S.E.2d at 831; Johnson v. Lewis, 251
N.C. 797, 803, 112 S.E.2d 512, 516 (1960).
48. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1984).
49. See supra note 17 (full text of § 52-4).
50. Before the statute's enactment,
an injury to the person of the wife gave rise to two causes of action: (1) that of the wife
individually for personal loss and injuries, enforced through the husband; and, (2) that of
the husband for damages to his marital interests... ; or for damages by reason of his being
put to expense. The wife had no corresponding right to sue for injury to her husband.
Note, Domestic Relations-Loss of Consortium from Injury to Spouse, 29 N.C.L. REv. 178, 179-80(1951); see also Price v. Charlotte Elec. Ry. Co., 160 N.C. 450, 76 S.E. 502 (1912) (husband is a
necessary party to the wife's personal injury suits). The statute by giving title to the wife, effectively
enabled her to sue for damages in her own name. See Helmstetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821,
824, 32 S.E,2d 611, 613 (1945), overruled on other grounds by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memo-
rial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
51. 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925), overruled by Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial
Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
52. Id. at 124-26, 128, 126 S.E. at 309-10, 312. North Carolina still recognized a cause of
action when a third party intentionally deprived one spouse of consortium by alienating the affec-
tions of the marital partner. See Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 301,
266 S.E.2d 818, 821 (1980); Note, Cannon v. Miller: The Brief Death ofAlienation of Affections and
Criminal Conversation in North Carolina, 63 N.C.L. REV. 1317 (1985).
53. 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980).
1338 [Vol. 65
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fication, and affection as well as services.54 Because these were all rights
peculiar to the uninjured spouse, that spouse could maintain an action for loss of
consortium so long as that action was joined with all other suits against the
defendant for the injury.55 The holding in Nicholson constituted an acknowledg-
ment that individuals maintain peculiarly personal rights within the context of
marital relationships.
North Carolina's equitable distribution law incorporates this desire to rec-
ognize the rights of individual spouses within a marriage. The statute contains a
detailed listing of instances in which a spouse can establish that certain property
is separate. 56 In addition, property acquired by a spouse during the course of
the marriage remains the separate property of that spouse.57 The statute offers
even further protection to separate property by providing that an increase in the
value of such property is separate property as well. 58
The equitable distribution statute does not expressly address the status of
personal injury awards. Before the Johnson decision, only one other case had
dealt with the issue. Little v. Little59 involved a dispute over the proper disposi-
tion of insurance proceeds received by the husband.60 The court of appeals
agreed with the trial court that the proceeds constituted marital property. 6 1 The
court's apparent rationale for this holding was that such awards are marital
54. Id. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
55. Id. at 304, 266 S.E.2d at 823. Thejoinder requirement exists to prevent double recovery for
loss of services. See id. at 303-04, 266 S.E.2d at 822-23.
56. The spouse can establish that property is separate property if it was acquired before mar-
riage or was acquired during marriage by bequest, devise, gift, or descent. Professional and business
licenses, the expectation of nonvested deferred compensation rights, and property or value that can
be traced to separate property are also considered separate property. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-
20(b)(2) (1984). This section is unusually extensive and detailed, and has been criticized for
"creat[ing] ... a smaller pool of assets subject to division than any other state in the union." Sharp,
supra note 38, at 253.
57. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
58. Id. The North Carolina courts, cognizant of both policies underlying equitable distribution
law, have interpreted this last provision to mean that only passive increases in property value remain
separate. That part of the appreciation that can be traced to the active efforts of one or both of the
spouses, on the other hand, belongs to the marital estate. See Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 379,
325 S.E.2d 260, 268, disc rev. denied, 313 N.C. 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985). In Wade the husband
purchased a lot shortly before marrying; during the course of the marriage, the couple made many
improvements to the property. The court found that the appreciation in value resulting from the
improvements were distinguishable from mere passive appreciation in property. The former can be
viewed as a distinct asset acquired during the marriage.
The Wade court thus took the position that the acquisition of property was an ongoing, dy-
namic process. Id. at 380, 325 S.E.2d at 268-69. The court expressly rejected the alternative theory,
known as the "transmutation through commingling," which views the commingling of separate and
marital assets as sufficient to transform the separate property into marital property. The court stated
that such a rule would run directly contrary to the words of the statute and, therefore, the intent of
the general assembly. Id. at 381, 325 S.E.2d at 269.
The approach the court adopted, the source of funds theory, looks to the source of the funds
used to acquire an asset. The Wade court explicitly recognized that this system can lead to the dual
classification of some property as part marital and part separate. Id. at 381-82, 325 S.E.2d at 269.
Thus, Johnson was not the first decision in North Carolina to adopt a dual classification system.
59. 74 N.C. App. 12, 327 S.E.2d 283 (1985).
60. The husband was partially paralyzed in a motorcycle accident. Id. at 14, 327 S.E.2d at 286.
The Johnson court did not distinguish life insurance proceeds from other personal injury settlements
for the purpose of this issue. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 449-50, 346 S.E.2d at 437.
61. Little, 74 N.C. App. at 16, 327 S.E.2d at 287.
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property because they dre not specifically defined as separate property by stat-
ute.62 The court also noted that "some courts distinguish between money real-
ized as compensation for pain and suffering ... and that portion of an award
representing lost wages and medical expenses .... -"63 The trial court, however,
had found that the proceeds of the policy compensated the husband for his lost
wages and medical expenses. Lost wages and medical expenses are both marital
properties even under this alternative approach. Thus, the court avoided choos-
ing either theory of classification, and held that the award was marital property
under both approaches. 64
The North Carolina Supreme Court had little precedent to which it could
look for guidance in the resolution of the issue in Johnson. The statute, on its
face, is silent concerning the proper classification of personal injury awards. The
two court of appeals decisions dealing with the subject had produced an array of
different views with no real consensus. Consequently, the Johnson court looked
outside the jurisdiction for guidance and evaluated the case law and statutes of
other states.
The court considered the laws in existence in both community property and
equitable distribution states.65 A few states have declared that recoveries for
personal injuries are entirely separate property; 66 most of the states that have
dealt with the issue, however, have taken one of two approaches. The majority
of the community property states have adopted the analytic approach, and di-
vide the recovery into components of both separate and marital property. In
contrast, most equitable distribution states have classified the award as solely
marital property pursuant to a mechanistic approach.67
Originally, most community property states viewed personal injury awards
as entirely community property.68 In more recent years they have changed their
62. See id.
63. Id. at 17, 327 S.E.2d at 288.
64. Id. This approach does not recognize that some of the lost earnings represent post-separa-
tion income. The Johnson court, in discussing Little, failed to criticize or even mention this fact. See
Johnson, 317 N.C. at 449.50, 346 S.E.2d at 437.
65. Almost all states fall under one of these labels. Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Ne-
vada, New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin are community property states. Most of the
other states practice some form of equitable distribution. See Freed & Walker, Family Law in the
Fifty States: An Overview, 19 FAM. L.Q. 331, 354-55 (1986) (table IV).
66. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800(c) (West 1983) ("[Community property personal injury dam-
ages shall be assigned to the party who suffered the injuries unless the court... determines that the
interests of justice require another disposition."); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 236(d)(2) (McKinney
1986) ("The term separate property shall mean ... compensation for personal injuries."). Even in
these states, however, the statutory law is not absolute. In California a court has some limited ability
to alter the disposition. CAL. CIVIL CODE § 4800(c) (West 1983). In New York most courts have
interpreted the statutory language quite literally. See, eg., Ettinger v. Ettinger, 107 Misc. 2d 675,
682, 435 N.Y.S.2d 916, 920-21 (Sup. Ct. 1981). One court, however, interpreted the statute to char-
acterize the noneconomic loss sustained by the injured party as separate property. The economic
loss suffered would presumably be considered marital property. See Rich v. Rich, 126 Misc. 2d 536,
536, 483 N.Y.S.2d 150, 150 (Sup. Ct. 1984).
67. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 446-47, 346 S.E.2d at 435-36.
68. See, eg., Pacific Constr. Co. v. Cochran, 29 Ariz. 554, 243 P. 405 (1926), overruled by Jurek
v. Jurek, 124 Ariz. 596, 606 P.2d 812 (1980); Hawkins v. Front St. Cable Ry. Co., 3 Wash. 592, 28
P. 1021 (1892), overruled by Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 675 P.2d 1207 (1984).
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laws. 69 These states became dissatisfied with the former system because it failed
to consider fully the "true principles of community property."' 70 For example,
the earlier system overlooked a distinction that is fundamental in community
property law: The difference between onerous and lucrative title.
7 1
The concepts of onerous title and lucrative title first emerged under the
community property system of Spain, and provided the basis for distinguishing
between community and separate property. 72 Title acquired by either spouse
during the course of the marriage vested in both spouses at the time of acquisi-
tion under the theory that both spouses should share equally in the fruits of their
labor, industry, or other valuable consideration. 73 Property acquired by these
methods was said to be acquired by onerous title.74
In cases in which the property was not acquired by onerous title, the justifi-
cation for vesting the title equally in both spouses vanished. Accordingly, when
a spouse either owned property prior to marriage or acquired property by lucra-
tive title-that is, by gift, succession, or inheritance-it was his or her own prop-
erty.75 Community property states in this country statutorily recognize this
distinction by defining property acquired by these methods as separate prop-
erty.76 Initially, these states conducted a purely statutory analysis of personal
injury awards and concluded that because the damages were not specifically pro-
vided for by statute, they fell within the catch-all category of community
property.
77
69. Today, eight of the nine community property states take the analytic approach. See Jurek
v. Jurek, 124 Ariz. 596, 606 P.2d 812 (1980); Cook v. Cook, 102 Idaho 651, 637 P.2d 799 (1981);
Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 560 P.2d 876 (1977); Luxton v. Luxton, 98 N.M. 276, 648 P.2d 315
(1982); Soto v. Vandeventer, 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952); Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729,
675 P.2d 1207 (1984); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2344 (West 1985); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.121(1)
(1979) (dividing damages awarded jointly into components based on pain and suffering, loss of con-
sortium, and lost earnings and expenses); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.130 (1979) (personal injury award
acquired by each spouse constitutes separate property); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon
1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 766.31(7)(f) (West Supp. 1986).
Courts in the other state, California, generally hold that personal injury awards are separate
property. See supra note 66 (discussing the California statute).
70. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 82, at 201 (2d
ed. 1971).
71. See id. § 62; Blumberg, Marital Property Treatment of Pensions, Disability Pay, Workers'
Compensation, and Other Wage Substitutes: An Insurance, or Replacement, Analysis, 33 UCLA L.
REV. 1250, 1253 n.9 (1986); Note, Personal Injury Recoveries as Community Property, 23 ARIZ. L.
REV. 384, 386 (1981) [hereinafter Note, Personal Injury]; Note, Worker's Compensation-Marital
Property, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 531, 546 (1983) (analogizing the distinction to that between separate
and marital property).
72. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 62.
73. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 62.
74. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 62; Note, Personal Injury, supra note
71, at 386.
75. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 62.
76. See, eg., LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (West 1985); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01
(Vernon 1975).
77. See W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 82; Note, Dissolution of Marriage-
Personal Injury Damages as Marital Property in Missouri: Nixon v. Nixon, 41 Mo. L. REv. 603, 606
(1976). Another rationale for the rule was that the personal injury itself diminished the capacity of
the community to attain property. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 82. This latter
justification serves as the basis for allowing the community to claim a portion of the award under the
analytic approach. See infra note 78 and accompanying text. Finally, the approach reflects the
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Critics of this early approach to characterizing personal injury proceeds
originally suggested the analytic approach. These commentators claimed that
the earlier system was overly simplistic and failed to examine the nature of the
personal injury award itself:
Except for gifts clearly made to the marital community, community
property only consists of that which is acquired by onerous title ....
It must be plainly evident that a right of action for injuries to person
... or the compensation received therefor, is not property acquired by
onerous title.... [T]he compensation partakes of the same character
as that which has been injured .... [W]hat or who has been injured?
Is it the marital community or is it the separate individuality of the
spouse? In actuality, both. The physical injury to the spouse, the pain
and suffering of the spouse therefrom is an injury to the spouse as an
individual.... But... if the injury deprives the marital community of
the earnings or services of the spouse, that is an injury to the marital
community; likewise there is loss to the community where the commu-
nity funds are expended for hospital and medical expenses .... 78
The development of the analytic method of characterizing personal injury
proceeds in community property states is also inextricably connected to the right
to sue.79 The two early cases that pioneered the analytic approach focused pri-
marily on this right. In Fredrickson & Watson Construction Co. v. Boyd 80 the
general policy in community property law favoring community over separate ownership. See Com-
ment, Selected Problems in the Equal Management of Community Property, 60 TuL L. REv. 821,
822 (1986).
This early method of dealing with personal injury proceeds mirrors the mechanistic analysis
employed by many equitable distribution states today. See, eg., Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 169,
711 S.W.2d 447, 452 (1986); In re Marriage of Fjeldheim, 676 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Colo. Ct. App.
1983); Gan v. Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268-69, 404 N.E.2d 306, 309 (1980); Nixon v. Nixon, 525
S.W.2d 835, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
In Bero v. Bero, 134 Vt. 533, 367 A.2d 165 (1976), a case cited by the Johnson court as follow-
ing this approach, the Vermont Supreme Court refused to subdivide a personal injury award and
recognize future earnings as separate property. Id. at 535, 367 A.2d at 165. The court did not
discuss its reasons for assuming that the settlement was marital property. At the time of the Bero
case, however, Vermont adhered to the title system of property distribution. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 751 (1974). Actual distribution of assets was handled pursuant to an alimony award. Under
the system in effect at that time, a lump sum alimony award, or the award of real property, was
possible. See id. § 754.
Today, the Bero court's statement that personal injury awards are marital property has no sig-
nificance in Vermont. Vermont amended its statute in 1981, and it is now an all-property equitable
distribution state. See id. § 751. All-property states allow their courts to distribute all the property
owned by either or both spouses. See id. These states theoretically vest a great deal more discretion
in their courts than do the equitable distribution states that limit the pool of distributable assets to
those statutorily labeled marital property. See Sharp, supra note 38, at 248-49 (arguing that some
"all property" states have statutes mandating that the court consider several factors in making the
distributions and that practically, this mandate can often be almost as restrictive as the title property
system).
78. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 70, § 82, at 201-03 (footnotes omitted); see also
Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WAsH. L. REv. 729, 773-74 (1974) (dam-
ages for pain and suffering "more appropriately" classified as separate property); Green, The Texas
Death Act, 26 TEX. L. REv. 461 (1948) (discussing and criticizing the original system).
79. In North Carolina, an equitable distribution state, personal injury awards were character-
ized as separate property to give women the right to sue for recovery. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4
(1984); Note, supra note 50, at 181-82. The issue is discussed supra notes 46-50 and accompanying
text.
80. 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d 627 (1940).
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Nevada Supreme Court considered whether the contributory negligence of the
husband could be imputed to the injured wife, thus barring her personal injury
claim against a third party.81 The resolution of this issue, in turn, depended on
whether the cause of action belonged to the injured spouse or the community. If
the cause of action belonged to the community, any negligence on the part of the
community constituted contributory negligence and barred recovery. If, on the
other hand, the right belonged solely to the injured spouse, then the uninjured
spouses negligence was distinct and did not bar recovery.
8 2
Relying heavily on the reasoning of commentators, the Fredrickson court
concluded that " 'a cause of action for a personal injury is based on the violation
of a separate right, namely, the right to personal security.' "83 The court there-
fore held that the wife could maintain her cause of action despite her husband's
contributory negligence. 84 The court criticized the then-prevalent rule that the
damages belong to the community as "'in conflict with the fundamental princi-
ples of compensation.' "85 The uninjured spouse, the court stated, only shares in
the right to compensation for the property in which he or she originally pos-
sessed rights: "'[his or] her services, and . ..the expense of. . .care and
cure.' "86
The New Mexico Supreme Court dealt with this issue in Soto v. Vandeven-
ter.87 In Soto the court drew the same distinction between injury to the person
and injury to the economic well-being of the community.88 As did the court in
Fredrickson, the court allowed the wife to sue a third party for injuries without
the joinder of the husband. 89 The court concluded the rule that the cause of
action belongs to the community rather than the individual was "utter
nonsense."
90
Soto and Fredrickson paved the way for other community property states,
which often relied on the reasoning of these courts in adopting the analytic
model.9 1 Because community property states determine title at the time of ac-
quisition, and at divorce merely divide the proceeds accordingly, the resolution
of the personal injury issue in the right to sue context also settled the problem of
how to divide personal injury damages at divorce.92
81. Id. at 119, 102 P.2d at 628.
82. See Akers, Blood and Money-Separate or Community Character of Personal Injury Recov-
ery, 9 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1, 34 (1977); Green, supra note 78, at 464.
83. Fredrickson, 60 Nev. at 122, 102 P.2d at 629 (quoting McKAY ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY
§ 398 (2d ed.)).
84. Id. at 123, 102 P.2d at 629.
85. Id. at 122, 102 P.2d at 629 (quoting McKAY ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 398 (2d ed.)).
86. Id. (quoting McKAY ON COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 398 (2d ed.)).
87. 56 N.M. 483, 245 P.2d 826 (1952). In Soto the wife attempted to sue in her own name to
recover damages for injuries caused by the negligence of an employee of defendant. Id. at 484-85,
245 P.2d at 826.
88. Id. at 494, 245 P.2d at 832-33.
89. Id. at 494, 245 P.2d at 833. The injured party's husband was able to sue to recover for
damages to the community. See id. at 485, 245 P.2d at 832.
90. Id. at 489, 245 P.2d at 829.
91. See cases and statutes cited supra note 69.
92. See, e.g., Luxton v. Luxton, 98 N.M. 276, 278, 648 P.2d 315, 317 (1982) (relying on Soto in
divorce context).
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Many equitable distribution states do not follow the example of the commu-
nity property states in this area of the law.93 There are many conceptual and
practical differences between the two systems that explain this fact. The primary
distinction is that, in equitable distribution states, title does not determine the
manner of distribution at divorce. Therefore, equitable distribution states could
make personal injury awards separate property during the course of the mar-
riage to give each spouse the right to sue without resolving the question of char-
acterization for the purpose of equitable distribution. 94 In addition, equitable
distribution jurisdictions do not define property based on whether it is attained
through onerous or lucrative title. Instead, courts in these states divide those
assets that their statutes enable them to distribute based on equitable considera-
tions that are often enumerated in the statute.
This system readily lends itself to a mechanical analysis. Consequently, a
majority of the equitable distribution states mechanically evaluate personal in-
jury awards, find the awards are not specifically set forth as separate property,
and classify the proceeds as marital property. 95 Not all of the equitable distribu-
tion states hold that personal injury damages are marital property, however.
Some courts find the reasoning of the community property states persuasive and
follow the same basic approach. 96
Many states adhering to the analytic model have declared that because an
analysis of the nature of the award determines the classification of its various
components, it is unnecessary to ask either when the injury occurred or when
the award was received. 97 A settlement received before valuation that consisted
completely of compensation for pain and suffering is entirely separate property.
A post-separation settlement that only compensates for medical expenses and
lost earnings, on the other hand, is wholly marital property although the award
93. See, e.g., Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 711 S.W.2d 447 (1986); Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d
835 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
94. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 444, 346 S.E.2d at 434; Green, supra note 78, at 487.
95. See Liles v. Liles, 289 Ark. 159, 169, 711 S.W.2d 447, 452 (1986); In re Marriage of
Fjeldheim, 676 P.2d 1234, 1236 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983); Gan v. Gan, 83 Ill. App. 3d 265, 268-69, 404
N.E.2d 306, 309 (1980); Nixon v. Nixon, 525 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). New Jersey
appears to fall into this group, but the actual status of personal injury proceeds in that state is
unclear. In the 1974 case of Di Tolvo v. Di Tolvo, 131 N.J. Super. 72, 328 A.2d 625 (App. Div.
1974), the superior court adopted this approach and, a few years later, the state supreme court
expressly approved it in dicta. See Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 464, 472, 375 A.2d 659, 664 (1977).
Later cases have followed the Di Tolvo approach. See Landwehr v. Landwehr, 200 N.J. Super. 56,
490 A.2d 342 (App. Div. 1985). In Amato v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210, 434 A.2d 639 (App. Div.
1981), however, the New Jersey superior court argued that Di Tolvo should be limited to cases in
which the settlement was received prior to divorce; when an inchoate right to recovery is involved,
the marital estate should only be compensated for lost earnings and expenses during the marriage.
The court apparently adopted an analytic approach instead of the mechanistic one implicitly en-
dorsed by the state supreme court in Kruger. See id.; see also Harmon v. Harmon, 161 N.J. Super.
206, 212-18, 391 A.2d 552, 555-58 (App. Div. 1978) (Botter, J., concurring) (urging the state to
adopt the analytic approach and claiming that it was not precluded by Kruger).
96. See Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 462, 339 S.E.2d 591, 593 (1986); In re Marriage of
Gerlich, 379 N.W.2d 689, 691 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); Van de Loo v. Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173,
176-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); see also Gloria B.S. v. Richard G.S., 458 A.2d 707, 708 (Del. Fam.
Ct. 1982) (determining that the award is entirely the separate property of the injured spouse even if
an injury occurs during the course of the marriage).
97. See Jurek v. Jurek, 124 Ariz. 596, 598, 606 P.2d 812, 813-14 (1980); Brown v. Brown, 100
Wash. 2d 729, 738, 675 P.2d 1207, 1212 (1984).
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was not actually received until after the valuation date. An award received
before the marriage and compensating for an injury that occurred before the
marriage might still be considered partly marital property; that part of the
award compensating for lost wages and medical expenses during the marriage
would belong to the marital estate.98 Finally, an award compensating for an
injury that occurred after the valuation date would never compensate for losses
suffered by the marital estate. An analysis of the award itself therefore renders a
deter ination of the timing issue unnecessary; for, in the course of evaluating
the damages, courts answer timing questions to the degree to which they are
relevant.
The states that hold this view, consistent with this general framework for
analysis, do not merely divide the award into economic and noneconomic losses.
The economic loss is further broken down into damages occurring before the
marriage and those occurring after the marriage.99 Compensation for post-mar-
ital medical expenses belongs to the injured spouse. In addition, because future
earnings are the separate property of the spouse, the compensation for post-
divorce lost earnings is also the separate property of the injured spouse. 100
As some courts and commentators have pointed out, there is a sharp dis-
tinction between vested personal injury awards and an inchoate right to sue to
recover damages for personal injury. One court noted that
an inchoate personal injury claim, unlike some other right to sue, is not
a property right. . . . The right has none of the attributes of prop-
erty.... [T]he right cannot be sold or assigned prior to judgment and
cannot be transferred from an injured debtor to his trustee in
bankruptcy....
... [A] personal injury claim is not a property right.., in our
common law.101
Because there is no property in existence at the time of separation, then, there is
no marital asset to divide at the time of separation. It is not until the damages
are recouped from the tortfeasor that the recovery is divided between the
spouses. 102
98. Blumberg, supra note 71, at 1284; see Akers, supra note 82, at 32-33.
99. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Blankenship, 682 P.2d 1354, 1357 (Mont. 1984) (equitable dis-
tribution); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2344 (West 1985) (community property); TEXAS FAM. CODE
ANN. § 5.01(a)(3) (Vernon 1975) (community property).
100. See In re Marriage of Kosko, 125 Ariz. 517, 518, 611 P.2d 104, 105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)
(in community property jurisdiction, court of appeals interpreting Jurek to hold "any portion of a
recovery which represents compensation for post-dissolution earnings of the injured spouse is the
separate property of that spouse"); Campbell v. Campbell, 255 Ga. 461, 462, 339 S.E.2d 591, 593
(1986) (in equitable distribution jurisdiction, wages lost during the marriage included in distributable
pool of assets); Van de Loo v. Van de Loo, 346 N.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (equita-
ble distribution); Brown v. Brown, 100 Wash. 2d 729, 738, 675 P.2d 1207, 1212-13 (1984) (commu-
nity property); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2344 (West 1985) (community property).
101. Amato v. Amato, 180 N.J. Super. 210, 216-18, 434 A.2d 639, 642-43 (1981).
102. Id. As the court explained,
[t]he fact that no settlement has been achieved presents no insurmountable procedural
problem. The husband can join the wife's suit to assert his right of action if it seems
worthwhile. If he does not, the wife's suit can present the lost past wages and medical
expenses.... Special jury interrogatories may be utilized to delineate the separate factors
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The Johnson court compiled its version of the analytic approach from a
wide array of choices. The court declared the approach it adopted to be "consis-
tent with the letter and spirit of our Equitable Distribution Act." 103 The discus-
sion of the issue reveals that the court attempted to balance the conflicting
interests at stake, recognizing and giving credence to the partnership ideal with-
out ignoring the rights of the individual spouses. As the supreme court noted,
the Equitable Distribution Act attempts to make divorcing spouses share their
property equitably. 1°4 By declaring that the part of a recovery representing
property acquired during the marriage is marital property, the court recognized
this fundamental principle. At the same time the court acknowledged that cer-
tain portions of personal injury awards represent damages personal to one of the
spouses.10 5 Use of the analytic framework thus enabled the court to recognize
all of these aspects of any recovery.
The court identified three potential recipients of the award: the marital
estate, the injured spouse, and the uninjured spouse.106 Marital property should
properly include damages to the marital estate itself. Because wages earned dur-
ing the marriage constitute marital property, 107 compensation for wages lost
during the marriage constitutes marital property. In addition, medical expenses
and other costs borne by the marital estate are expenses of the estate rather than
of a particular spouse.108 Therefore, compensation for those economic losses
should also be considered marital property.
The court further noted that part of a personal injury award often compen-
sates the injured spouse for the pain and suffering that results from the injury
and any resulting physical deformity. North Carolina courts, the Johnson court
stated, have long recognized the "uniquely personal" nature of pain and suffer-
ing.109 Accordingly, the court held that the part of the award compensating for
pain and suffering belonged wholly to the injured spouse.110
This aspect of the Johnson decision indicates the importance accorded to
the individual in North Carolina.'11 It is somewhat ironic that this same princi-
ple led the court to distinguish painstakingly the right-to-sue statute from the
of recovery.... Thereafter, if the divorced spouses cannot agree to a reasonable allocation
of the distributable items recovered, application to a matrimonial judge will resolve the
dispute including a determination of a pro rata responsibility for attorneys' fees and suit
expense. The same procedures can be employed should the matter be settled.
Id. at 219-20, 434 A.2d at 644.
103. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 451, 346 S.E.2d at 438.
104. Id. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 437.
105. Id. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 438.
106. Id. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40.
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984).
108. Of course, if the couple paid these expenses with funds that were traceable to separate
property of either spouse, that spouse could claim that portion of the award as separate property.
For a discussion of tracing principles, see Sharp, supra note 35, at 220-21. For a discussion of the
burdens of proof involved in establishing that separate property was involved, and the confusion in
which the Johnson decision leaves this area, see infra notes 138-53 and accompanying text.
109. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 438.
110. Id. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40.
111. See supra notes 46-58 and accompanying text.
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equitable distribution statute earlier in the opinion.1 12 The court, however, was
correct in its assessment of both issues.
First, the characterization of personal injury proceeds in section 52-4 has
no bearing on the decision of how to divide the award at divorce. Section 52-4
grants title of these awards to the injured spouse during marriage for the sole
purpose of ensuring that the wife has the right to sue without the joinder of the
other spouse.1 13 As the supreme court noted in Johnson, the initial determina-
tion of title in this context as well as others is not binding on the courts' classifi-
cation of property at divorce. 114
The justification for characterizing personal injury awards as separate prop-
erty, then, must lie elsewhere. In its discussion of the issue, the Johnson court
implicitly accepted the injured spouse's argument that the equitable distribution
statute mandates this result. Plaintiff, echoing the view of many states, ex-
plained that the physical well-being of an individual is his or her personal prop-
erty. Money received to compensate for an injury to that well-being should,
therefore, be considered "[piroperty acquired in exchange for separate prop-
erty," 115 which, under the statute, is also separate property.116 The court
adopted this view with an important qualification: recovery for economic losses
is analyzed distinctly and belongs to the marital estate.1 17 This approach is ana-
lytically sound; failure to distinguish between the personal and marital losses
incurred would lead to a superficial and incomplete breakdown of the personal
injury award.
The final potential component of the award belongs to the uninjured
spouse. The court found that part of a personal injury award may compensate
for loss of consortium. If the uninjured spouse can establish this loss, then he or
she is entitled to that portion of the award as separate property. 118
This part of the court's analysis is somewhat problematic. Each spouse
does have a cause of action in his or her own name for loss of consortium. How-
ever, this action is no more determinative of the way the award should be dis-
tributed than section 52-4, regarding personal injury awards. 119 Simply
awarding this part of the recovery to the uninjured spouse could potentially lead
to unfair results.
To avoid unfairness, the court should apply its analytical system to divide
the award appropriately. Such an analysis reveals that consortium consists of
"services, society, companionship, sexual gratification, and affection .... ,12o
112. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 440-45, 346 S.E.2d at 432-34.
113. See Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 298, 266 S.E.2d at 823. The statute later was expanded to grant
the right to sue to both spouses. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-4 (1984).
114. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 443-44, 346 S.E.2d at 434.
115. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (1984).
116. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 447, 346 S.E.2d at 436.
117. See id. at 447-48, 346 S.E.2d at 436 (defining economic loss to include "loss of earning
capacity during the marriage" (emphasis added)).
118. See id. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 440.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 113-114.
120. Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 302, 266 S.E.2d at 822.
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Although most of these losses are personal to the uninjured spouse, 12 1 the loss of
services is not and should therefore be distributed to the marital estate. This
component may well be absent from the award in many cases; to avoid double
recovery for economic loss, the state requires that all suits against a party for the
injury be joined.1 22 In most cases the damages will include a separate part rep-
resenting economic losses. The consortium award then will be limited to cover
noneconomic loss and will belong solely to the uninjured spouse. Thus, in the
majority of cases, the supreme court's treatment of loss of consortium will yield
the correct result. However, because the court has adopted an incorrect analy-
sis, when the loss of consortium award includes economic recovery 123 the
court's approach will yield results inconsistent with the analytic model.
Justice Martin made a similar argument regarding the court's treatment of
disfigurement. North Carolina worker's compensation law has recognized that
"[d]isfigurement . . .may affect the earning capacity of a marital part-
ner ...... ,,124 Therefore, Justice Martin contended that the court should have
considered as marital property the portion of the award constituting lost earning
capacity resulting from the disfigurement.1 2 5
In the case of disfigurement, however, this further breakdown is unneces-
sary. Worker's compensation awards, which do not include a component for
pain and suffering, 126 would always be labeled marital property to the extent
they compensate for lost earnings prior to separation.1 27 In these cases the fur-
ther analysis would be completely unnecessary. In other types of personal injury
awards, the category of lost earnings prior to separation will necessarily include
any loss of earning capacity that results from disfigurement. This type of case is
distinguishable from the consortium situation because damages for loss of con-
sortium have been defined as including loss of services. A jury could easily
award damages for lost services as part of its award for loss of consortium. Be-
cause the Johnson court declared that entire sum the separate property of the
uninjured spouse, it is quite possible that economic damages properly considered
part of the marital estate will go to the uninjured spouse alone. There is no
similar preexisting definition that sweeps economic damages into the category of
disfigurement. The Johnson court's labels in the areas of loss of earning capacity
and disfigurement simply provide guidelines that courts can employ in analyzing
personal injury awards. If, for example, a performer was disfigured in an acci-
dent and this disfigurement prevented him or her from obtaining employment, a
121. Cf. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 447, 346 S.E.2d at 436 (noting the elements of pain and suffering
and their uniquely personal character).
122. See Nicholson, 300 N.C. at 303-04, 266 S.E.2d at 823.
123. Inclusion of economic recovery in the award probably would occur only in cases in which
the consortium action was not joined with a suit for the injury itself. In these instances, the consor-
tium action would necessarily be the only action brought. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
124. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 456, 346 S.E.2d at 441 (Martin, J., concurring).
125. Id. at 456-57, 346 S.E.2d at 441 (Martin, J., concurring).
126. See 1 A. LARSON, LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 2.40, at 11 (1952) ("There is no
place in compensation law for damages on account of pain and suffering, however dreadful they may
be.").
127. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40 (distinguishing between wages lost prior
to separation and those lost subsequent to separation).
1348 [Vol. 65
DOMESTIC LAW
proper analysis under Johnson would mandate the conclusion that compensation
for the earnings lost constituted marital property. This would be true even
though the reason for the diminished capacity of the injured spouse was his or
her disfigurement. A further breakdown of the disfigurement category, then,
would be superfluous.
The Johnson court did choose to subdivide the economic loss portion of the
settlement. Although in parts of its discussion the court appears to divide the
award generally into its economic and -noneconomic components, ' 2 8 the case
taken as a whole makes clear the court anticipated loss of future earnings will be
deemed the separate property of the injured spouse. 129 This result is correct
under North Carolina law. The future earnings of the spouse are not considered
in determining the size of the marital estate. 130 Instead, future earnings come
into play in determining alimony. 13' Therefore, it would be inconsistent with
other North Carolina law if future earnings were not distinguished from eco-
nomic loss in general. Similarly, because medical and other expenses subsequent
to separation will be paid by the injured spouse alone, compensation for those
future costs should go to the injured spouse. Accordingly, the Johnson decision
provides that this amount be treated as separate property as well.' 3 2
Justice Martin attempted to clarify further the court's approach in his con-
curring opinion. He contended that "it is the cause of action, and not its pro-
ceeds, which is the property at issue [in these cases]." 133 If the settlement itself
were being evaluated, he argued, then the court would simply declare the prop-
erty entirely separate because it was received after separation. Instead, the court
focused on the cause of action and consequently analyzed its various parts.' 3 4
128. See id. at 447-48, 346 S.E.2d at 436 (breaking award down into loss of consortium; pain,
suffering, disability, disfigurement, and lost limbs; and lost wages, lost earning capacity, and medical
expenses; and describing "economic" and "non-economic" losses).
129. See, eg., id. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40 (describing as injured spouse's separate property
compensation for lost earning capacity subsequent to separation, lost wages subsequent to separa-
tion, and expenses arising after separation).
130. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(a), (b) (1984). The future ability or inability of either spouse
to earn income may come into play when the marital property is distributed. The court may decide
that the inability of the injured spouse to earn income in the future entitles him or her to a larger
share of the assets. Conversely, the court may award a greater portion of the marital estate to the
uninjured spouse if the injured spouse has been able to establish that a large portion of the personal
injury award is his or her separate property. See id. § 50-20(c) (listing factors the court may con-
sider in determining whether to distribute the marital property unequally). This issue, however, is
distinct from the determination of what is marital property and what is separate property. See supra
notes 37-40 and accompanying text.
131. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.5 (1984) ("Alimony shall be in such amount as the circum-
stances render necessary, having due regard to... earning capacity .. "). An award of alimony
may later be modified if the earning capacity of the supporting spouse diminishes. See Rowe v.
Rowe, 52 N.C. App. 646, 654, 280 S.E.2d 182, 187 (1981) (changes in factors listed in N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-16.5 (1984) can warrant an order modifying alimony award), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part on other grounds, 305 N.C. 177, 287 S.E.2d 840 (1982), overruled on other grounds by Walter v.
Walter, 307 N.C. 381, 298 S.E.2d 338 (1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.9 (1984) (providing for
modification of alimony order).
132. See Johnson, 317 N.C. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40. This approach also has been widely
approved by commentators. See, eg., Akers, supra note 82, at 31-33; Blumberg, supra note 71, at
1282-84.
133. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 456, 346 S.E.2d at 441 (Martin, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 455-56, 346 S.E.2d at 440-41 (Martin, J., concurring).
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Justice Martin's argument is both ambiguous and incorrect. 135 What the
court actually held was that neither the cause of action nor the settlement is the
property at issue in these personal injury disputes. The settlement is viewed as
property received in exchange for other property, and the focus is on the original
property replaced. Each component of the personal injury award is character-
ized as either marital or separate property depending on the nature of the prop-
erty it replaces. Thus, in a case in which both the cause of action and the
settlement took place before the marriage, a portion of the award may still be
considered marital property. 136 Justice Martin's argument, on the other hand,
would yield a contrary result.
In addition, Justice Martin asserted that "the mandate of the statute cre-
ate[d] a presumption that a settlement award representing the value of a cause of
action which arose during the marriage of the parties and before separation is
marital property." 137 He based this conclusion on the statement in the statute
that all property acquired during the marriage and not defined as separate prop-
erty is marital property. Apparently, Justice Martin interprets this to mean that
if a cause of action is acquired during the marriage, it is property acquired dur-
ing the marriage. This interpretation is sufficient to create a presumption of
marital property, which must be rebutted before the property can be labeled
separate.
This contention is consistent with the general view, expressed in several
court of appeals decisions, that the statute creates a presumption that all prop-
erty acquired during the marriage is marital property. 138 However, it was un-
equivocally rejected by the Johnson court: "The North Carolina General
Assembly... did not choose to provide such a presumption by statute, and this
Court will not infer one by judicial decision." 139 The court further found that
the presumption was unnecessary under North Carolina's statutory scheme. Be-
cause the statute specifically defines certain items as separate property and de-
clares that everything else is marital property, courts should be able to evaluate
the proof presented and characterize the property accordingly. This process, the
court contended, does not necessitate the use of presumptions. 14
As the Johnson court pointed out, the general assembly did not include a
provision mandating a presumption of marital property.1 4 1 Consequently, it
was initially unclear whether such a presumption existed. Nonetheless, a major-
ity of North Carolina courts reaching the issue have held that, pursuant to the
Equitable Distribution Act, all property is presumed marital. 142 The signifi-
135. Justice Martin's ambiguity, perhaps, reflects the ambiguity of the majority opinion itself.
Although an examination of the opinion reveals that the North Carolina Supreme Court expects
courts to distinguish between economic losses accruing before and after the marriage, the Johnson
decision never actually discusses the theoretical basis for this result.
136. See supra text accompanying note 98.
137. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 455, 346 S.E.2d at 440 (Martin, J., concurring).
138. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text.
139. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 454 n.4, 346 S.E.2d at 440 n.4.
140. Id.
141. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (1984).
142. See Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 209, 324 S.E.2d 33, 38, cert. denied, 313 N.C. 508, 329
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cance of this presumption is two fold: It places the burden of proof on spouses
claiming separate property, and it symbolizes the importance of the partnership
ideal in North Carolina. 143 The supreme court's pronouncement, then, will
have both practical and theoretical repercussions.
The practical effect of the court's decision should not be too great.144 With
or without the existence of a presumption, if property is acquired during the
course of the marriage and does not fall into one of the excepted categories, it
will be considered marital property. Before property is declared the separate
property of the spouse, the spouse must assert that the property qualifies as sepa-
rate property under the statute. The party making an assertion generally has the
burden of producing evidence to establish the claim; 14 5 therefore, the spouse
who made this argument will bear the burden of producing evidence sufficient to
warrant consideration of the claim.
By refusing to impose a presumption of marital property, the Johnson court
removed the burden of persuasion from parties claiming separate property. 146
Prior to the decision claimants had to present a preponderance of the evidence
to prevent having the issue decided against them. 14 7 The Johnson decision has
changed this burden; now, if claimants can produce evidence on the issue of
separate property, they have satisfied their responsibility. Thereafter, the
factfinder can evaluate the issue and determine whether property is marital or
separate based solely on a weighing and balancing of the evidence.
Because the claimant still bears the burden of producing evidence, the John-
son court's determination will not have a tremendous practical effect. Generally,
once a claimant has asserted the property is separate and has presented evidence
to support the assertion, the presumption will be overcome. In some cases, how-
ever, testimony that has not been well-substantiated has been deemed insufficient
to rebut the presumption. 148 In these cases, the removal of the presumption will
have an effect. The decision will also make it easier for claimants to obtain a
favorable ruling in cases in which the allegedly separate property has been com-
mingled with marital property. Prior to Johnson, claimants had the burden of
tracing the separate property to its current form. 149 The removal of the pre-
sumption also removes the burden of establishing that particular property was
S.E.2d 393 (1985); McLeod v. McLeod, 74 N.C. App. 144, 157, 327 S.E.2d 910, 918, cert. denied,
314 N.C. 331, 333 S.E.2d 488 (1985). But see Wade v. Wade, 72 N.C. App. 372, 381, 325 S.E.2d
260, 269 (instead of finding that the general assembly intended to create such a presumption, the
court found that the general assembly intended that separate property brought into the marriage
remains separate property at divorce), disc. rev. denied, 313 N.C 612, 330 S.E.2d 616 (1985).
143. Sharp, supra note 35, at 203.
144. See Sharp, supra note 35, at 203 ("there have been relatively few cases in which the effect
of this presumption has been critical.").
145. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
146. See id.
147. See McManus v. McManus, 76 N.C. App. 588, 591-92, 334 S.E.2d 270, 273 (1985).
148. Id. at 592, 334 S.E.2d at 273 (although testimony supported the claim of separate property,
trial court determination that evidence was not strong enough to overcome the presumption would
not be overturned as a matter of law).
149. See, eg., Loeb v. Loeb, 72 N.C. App. 205, 212, 324 S.E.2d 33, 39 (1985) (wife's separate
property would have remained separate property "if she had been able to trace the proceeds"); see
also Brown v. Brown, 72 N.C. App. 332, 335-36, 324 S.E.2d 287, 289 (1985) (court found that funds
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acquired with separate funds or assets from the claimant. Consequently, a
claimant's task will be less complicated.150
The Johnson court's refusal to infer the presumption from the statute may
also signify a move away from the state's adherence to the partnership ideal.
The court's discussion of the reason for adopting the analytic approach in char-
acterizing personal injury awards suggests that such a move is not the case:
"'The obvious purpose of the Equitable Distribution Act is to require married
persons to share their maritally acquired property with each other . . ' ."151
Instead of making a symbolic departure from the defense of sharing principles,
the court simply refused to take what it viewed as unwarranted liberty and infer
a presumption it deemed unjustified by the statute.152 This conclusion, however,
is not necessarily correct; other states with similar statutes have found that such
a presumption was intended by their legislatures. 153 Although the effect of re-
moving the presumption will not be too significant, it would have been more
consistent with the frequently expressed goals of the Act to find there was a
presumption of marital property.
As Justice Martin correctly noted, the court apparently chose to retain the
presumption of marital property in the case of personal injury awards. The
Johnson court has required the party claiming that part of the award is separate
property to carry the burden of proving so by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.15 4 The court did not elaborate further; it neither explained its reasons for
establishing the burden of proof nor set forth the relevant standards for proving
part of the award is separate property. Presumably, the injured spouse will be in
the best position to present evidence regarding medical expenses and lost earn-
ings. Once those are separated from the award, it should be relatively easy to
determine what part of the recovery compensates for pain and suffering and
other "separate" aspects of the award.
Despite its minor flaws and ambiguities, Johnson is a good decision. It rec-
ognizes that the essence of a personal injury award is not merely the lump sum
awarded; instead, the award is comprised of many components. A correct allo-
cation of the award at divorce necessarily entails an analysis of those various
components. Although the court's decision not to find a presumption of marital
property in the statute is of questionable merit, its implicit decision to retain the
presumption in the context of personal injury proceeds properly acknowledges
deposited in joint savings account were separate property because claimant established, by "uncon-
tradicted evidence," that the money was traceable to his separate property).
150. For a discussion of tracing methods, see Sharp, supra note 35, at 220-21.
151. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 450, 346 S.E.2d at 437 (quoting Johnson, 75 N.C. App. at 661, 331
S.E.2d at 212).
152. Nevertheless, the court's abandonment of the presumption may be criticized. One com-
mentator has argued that the "preoccupation with equal rights concerns may dangerously skew our
vision of marital property questions ... ." See Prager, supra note 46, at 5. This emphasis, Prager
warned, may shift the focus from the sharing principles so important in the marital relationship to
individualistic principles inappropriate in this context. Id. at 2-6. Although the Johnson court ap-
peared to keep the sharing principles in mind, this criticism-and the danger that North Carolina
courts may begin to emphasize concepts of equality more than concepts of sharing-is worth noting.
153. See Sharp, supra note 35, at 202-03.
154. Johnson, 317 N.C. at 454, 346 S.E.2d at 439-40.
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that the spouse claiming part of the award as separate usually will be in the best
position to substantiate the claim. In general, then, Johnson is consistent with
the two fundamental principles guiding North Carolina divorce law: the rights
of the parties to a marriage and the partnership ideal.
BETH HERSTEIN
